Economic growth, institutions and corruption: An empirical study by Rytter, Even
 
 














The thesis is submitted to fulfil the requirements for the degree: 
 
Master’s in Economics 
 


















Writing this thesis has been educational, but also challenging. I want to thank Syed Quamrul 
Ahsan for his guidance and inputs in writing this thesis. Further, I would like to thank Arne and 
Vegard for making the last 5 years of studying an excellent experience. A special thanks to 








This paper seeks to explore why differences in economic growth occur across countries. Firstly, 
two models of economic growth are reviewed: the Solow model and the Romer model. The 
Solow model predicts a convergence in economic growth rates between countries, while the 
Romer model predicts that rich countries with a large stock of technological know-how will 
experience a higher growth in technology, and therefore achieve faster economic growth than 
poor countries. Secondly, following the literature, a growth accounting exercise is undertaken 
to decompose the growth rate of GDP per capita into three constituent terms: growth rate of 
capital-output ratio, growth rate of human capital per capita and growth rate of total factor 
productivity (TFP). From the derived expression, two estimating models are formulated: one 
for the growth rate of GDP per capita and one for the growth rate of TFP. Thirdly, institutions 
and corruption are discussed in light of the economic models and how they enter the proposed 
models. The paper employs fixed effects estimation, using a cross-country panel dataset 
consisting of 170 countries over a time period of 17 years, from 2002 to 2019. The results 
suggest that corruption has a negative effect on the growth rates of both real GDP per capita 
and TFP. This effect seems to be larger in poorer and more corrupt countries. Further, the results 
give evidence in favor of the hypothesis that corruption has beneficial effects on the growth rate 
of TFP in Southeast Asian countries. Three different software programs have been used in this 
study. Python and Microsoft Excel have been used to sort out and organize the dataset. Stata 
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In 1960 the world’s total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at 1,4 trillion US dollars, 
measured in constant 2010 US dollars (World Bank, 2021). At the time, this was among the 
highest registered levels of GDP in history. The unprecedented level of wealth had come as a 
result of continuous exponential growth over the last centuries since the start of the industrial 
revolution (Aghion & Durlauf, 2013). Only four years earlier, in 1956, the famous Solow-model 
of exogenous growth, developed by Robert Solow and Trevor Swan, became the dominant view 
among economists on how economic growth materialize. This is usually referred to as 
neoclassical theory of growth. Through accumulation of capital, a country could increase its 
economic output and wealth. Due to the diminishing marginal productivity of capital, the model 
predicted a convergence in economic growth. The countries that experienced low levels of 
economic output per capita due to low levels of capital per capita, should have a higher growth 
rate than countries with large per capita capital stocks. Consequently, there would be a 
convergence in per capita growth rates over time across countries (Solow, 1956).  
 
In 2019 the world’s total GDP stood at 87,7 trillion US dollars, almost 63 times that of the 
levels in 1960 (World Bank, 2021). Did the world experience a converge in economic growth 
that the Solow model had predicted? Some previously poor countries, like South Korea and 
Singapore, did in fact enjoy higher levels of economic output than before, but the majority of 
countries did not. In general, the countries that were poor in 1960 are the same countries that 
are poor today, and many face GDP levels which are only a fraction of those seen in 
industrialized countries like USA and several European countries. Even though accumulation 
of capital is still considered a major factor in economic growth, the Solow model cannot explain 
the wide divergences in growth rates between countries.  
 
Since the first appearance of the Solow model of economic growth, several other contributions 
have been made to improve the model’s shortcomings in explaining differences in growth rates. 
One important contribution was made by the economist Paul Romer in 1986, who integrated 
technology and productivity into the model in a meaningful way. The traditional neoclassical 
growth model did incorporate technological changes, but it was treated exogenously. The new 
approach by Romer (and others) transformed this aspect of the model into an endogenous 
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component. Differences in technology and productivity were seen as the main driver of 
economic growth. This improved version of growth theory achieved greater success in 
explaining differences in economic growth between countries (Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 
2010). Creation of new technology was now considered the source of growth in the long run. 
Due to the non-rival nature of technology, countries with already larger stocks of knowledge 
could create more new knowledge and enjoy higher growth rates compared to those with 
smaller stocks. In the theory of economic growth, the aspect of technology and productivity is 
referred to as total factor productivity (TFP). Differences in this is considered by many 
economists as the key reason to why some countries experience high growth and some not.  
 
Since differences in TFP is being treated as the dominant factor in explaining the divergences 
in economic growth, there has been a growing focus on why some countries have more TFP 
than others. The quality of institutions and the prevalence of corruption has been highlighted as 
being important factors in this regard. In order to have a functioning innovative environment, 
which is necessary for technological growth, there needs to be a certain level of quality in 
institutions, such as enforcement of property rights and government effectiveness. Without this, 
the expected return of innovative activities become low and uncertain. One of the reasons some 
countries lack this is the presence of corruption, as it could have a damaging effect on 
institutions. High quality institutions are also important for any investment, activities in order 
to make returns on investments more certain, raising the investment rate and consequently 
capital accumulation. Countries with good institutional quality and absence of corruption would 
therefore enjoy a higher growth in capital accumulation and TFP, and subsequently higher 
economic growth.  
 
This paper seeks to further explore into the subject of institutional quality, corruption, 
innovation and economic growth, and hopefully add to the literature. The neoclassical theory 
of economic growth predicts that poor countries should be able to obtain higher growth rates, 
while the Romer model predicts higher technological growth for rich countries, and 
subsequently higher economic growth. Empirically, the notion of convergence and rapid growth 
does not perform particularly well (Roland, 2016; Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010). Since 
the theories do not perform very well, there could be other factors that explain the divergences 
in economic growth. Institutions and corruption are important in this respect (Acemoglu, 
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Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Mauro, 1995). While there has been micro-evidence of a negative 
effect of corruption on growth, macro-evidence has been more ambiguous (Roland, 2016). 
Some argue that corruption impacts countries in different ways (Mahagaonkar, 2008). 
“Greasing the wheels” is a hypothesis that states that corruption could have a beneficial impact 
on growth in some countries, by speeding up bureaucratic processes. This is believed to be true 
for countries in Southeast Asia (Campos, Lien, & Pradhan, 1999). In opposition is the “sanding 
the wheel” hypothesis, which states that corruption has a negative impact on growth. This is 
believed to be true for sub-Saharan countries (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). The motivation for 
this paper is to explore the factors that drive differences in growth rates. A better understanding 
of these is important for devising policies of economic growth and development for the 
poor/developing countries in the world. Inspired by this motivation, this paper will try to answer 
the following research questions. What effect does corruption have on economic growth? Does 
the effect differ between rich and poor countries? Is the “greasing the wheel” and “sanding the 
wheel” hypothesizes true for Southeast Asian countries and Sub-Saharan countries, 
respectively? Does the data give support for convergence in growth rates? And finally, do rich 
countries have faster growth in TFP/technology than poor countries, as the Romer model 
predicts? These questions will be tried to be answered by examining a cross-sectional panel 
dataset on 170 different countries over the time period 2002 to 2019. Corruption is found to 
have a significant negative impact on the growth rate of both GDP per capita and TFP. The 
results also suggest that better institutional quality could mitigate this effect. Corruption is 
found to have a larger effect on poorer countries. For the Southeast Asian countries, the results 
give some evidence for a positive effect of corruption on growth in TFP. Further, the results 
give support for the convergence hypothesis. However, evidence was not found in support of 
higher growth in TFP for richer countries. A possible explanation is the fact that poor countries 
could simply copy new technology that has been developed through a long process of research 
and development in rich countries. In general, the results suggest that differences in institutional 
quality and corruption could be important determinants of economic growth, and that the effect 
of corruption is larger for poorer countries.  
 
The paper is set up as follows: Section 1 is the introduction. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
theory of endogenous growth. Section 3 gives an overview of the theory and literature 
concerning institutional quality, corruption, innovation and economic growth. Section 4 
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explains the data and methodology respectively. Section 5 goes through the results and 
discussion. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Economic theory 
This section aims to give an overview of the prevailing theories of economic growth. Firstly, a 
summary of the neoclassical growth model is presented, as it will work as a foundation. 
Secondly, a walkthrough of the endogenous growth theory will be made, in order to highlight 
the importance of the concepts of “total factor productivity” and “technological progress”. 
These models are beneficial when exploring the effects of corruption and institutional quality 
on growth and development. Lastly, by utilizing the concept of growth accounting, an 
expression for growth will be decomposed into an equation, which will serve as a basis for the 
econometric analysis in section 4.  
 
2.1 Neoclassical theory of growth 
Neoclassical theory of growth seeks to explain economic growth through three factors: capital, 
labor and technology. The theory is represented by the Solow model, which is a dynamic 
equilibrium model (Solow, 1956). It is assumed that the economy is closed and that the markets 
for inputs are perfect, which implies that prices are treated as given. Further, discrete units are 
time indexed and the capital stock is assumed to depreciate at a constant rate, ƌ. It is also 
assumed that the household sector saves a constant fraction of income, s, and that the population 
grows at a constant level. The entire production side of the economy can be thought of as being 
represented by a single firm. The relationship between the three factors, and the aggregate 
output is represented by a traditional production function, as equation (1) below.  
 
 𝑌 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡) = 𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼, 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] (1) 
 
Y represents the aggregate(economy-wide) production, usually measured as GDP, Kt is the 
stock of physical capital and Lt is labor. A represents TFP, which can be interpreted as the level 
of technological know-how. The subscript t stands for time, which implies that the levels of K 
and L evolves over time. A is considered a constant following Solow’s original specification. 
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F denotes the functional form, which is specified as a Cobb-Douglas production function. α is 
a parameter which reflects the share of capital in GDP. There are two important implications 
from the Cobb-Douglas specification. The first one is that production function exhibits 
decreasing marginal productivity to both capital and labor. Mathematically, this implies 
positive first derivatives of equation (1) with respect to the inputs, FK>0 and FL>0, as well as 
negative second derivatives FKK<0 and FLL<0. The second implication is that the function has 
constant returns to scale, which means that a doubling of both inputs also doubles the output.  
 
Equation (1) along with the assumptions have a number of implications. Since the economy is 
closed, all savings are invested domestically to create more capital for next period. The savings 
rate will therefore equal the investment rate, St = sYt = It. The additional capital for the next 
period will therefore be equal to the sum of the current capital stock and investment, less the 
amount that has depreciated, Kt+1 = (1- ƌ)Kt + sYt. Dividing this by labor, Lt, gives an expression 
for how capital per capita evolves over time, kt+1 = (1- ƌ)kt + syt. Since capital faces diminishing 
marginal productivity, the increase in output worker gets smaller for each additional unit of 
capital. Investments therefore faces diminishing returns as output per worker increases 
relatively less than capital per worker. Because capital depreciates at a constant rate and the 
population growth is constant, there will be a point in time where the additional capital per 
capita from investment, will be exactly offset by the amount that has depreciated and vanished 
due to population growth, meaning: kt+1 = kt. Growth in capital per capita and consequently 
output per capita, will therefore cease in the long run. This level of capital and output per capita 
are the equilibrium levels, referred to as the steady state values. The model therefore has two 
important implications. Firstly, growth in GDP per capita, which is explained by capital 
accumulation through investment, is zero in the long run. Secondly, the model predicts a 
convergence, as poor countries with low levels of capital per capita should experience higher 
returns to capital, and consequently higher growth in GDP per capita, than those with high 
levels. Poor countries will eventually catch up with the rich countries according to the model. 
This hypothesis will be explored in the empirical section of the paper. 
 
Empirically, there is support of the notion that higher savings and investments rates, and thus 
higher capital accumulation, is associated with higher growth (Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 
2010). Corruption could be an influencing factor in this respect, as widespread corruption 
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makes returns to investment more uncertain. However, the theory still has some glaring 
shortcomings. Contrary to the prediction of the neoclassical model, historical data show that 
the developed rich countries have not experienced zero growth in the long run and a substantial 
part of poor and developing countries have not seen higher growth rate relative to rich countries. 
(Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010). To address this shortcoming, Solow included growth in 
TFP as an exogenous component. If the TFP or A is assumed to change/grow at a constant rate, 
then the GDP per capita will also grow at the same constant rate in steady-state equilibrium. 
The source of this growth is then attributed to continuous technological advancement. However, 
the model does not explain how technology materializes. 
 
The basic Solow model explains growth through capital accumulation. However, it is possible 
to expand the model in order to include other possible important contributing factors. Such 
expansions could be to include human capital as an input of production, or by allowing the 
economy to be open to foreign trade and investment. Even though these extensions could give 
deeper insights in different aspects of growth, the Solow model does provide an important 
understanding of the basic underlying fundamentals.  
 
2.2 Endogenous growth theory 
Endogenous growth theory is an extension of the neoclassical growth theory. While TFP was 
included in the neoclassical theory, it was treated as exogenously given. The endogenous theory 
incorporates TFP as an endogenous component. Growth is then achieved through technological 
change, which is a result of entrepreneurial innovation (Roland, 2016; Romer, 1994). The 
theory was first introduced in 1986 by the economist Paul Romer, and his model has been an 
important contribution to the field of economic growth.  
 
2.2.1 Ideas 
Romer’s model maintains all the basic assumptions of the Solow model, although with some 
important modifications. Ideas as an economic good is now incorporated into the model, and 
can be thought of as a technology enhancing product. This requires that it is possible to produce 
ideas which in turn generate higher output. In practice, this is done in two ways. Firstly, there 
are pure research and development (R&D) companies that produce ideas which in turn is sold 
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off to other companies. This is usually done by selling patents or licenses. Secondly, regular 
businesses may have segments of their business dedicated to innovation, which can then 
increase their productivity and subsequently their income. Their idea can then be patented 
(Roland, 2016; Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010). Patent laws and its enforcement ensures 
that the owner of the patent obtain monopoly power. There will therefore be imperfect 
competition, making it possible for the innovators to extract monopoly profit. The driver behind 
technological growth is therefore the search for profit among innovators (Romer, 1994).  
 
Ideas are non-rival in nature, which means that once produced, there is no limit to how much 
that idea can be used by others. One firm’s usage of the idea does not prevent other firms from 
using it. An important aspect of non-rival goods is that the marginal cost of producing an extra 
unit is low and near zero. This has great implications for the form of the cost curves the firm 
faces. Another important aspect of ideas is that they are excludable. This is defined as the 
possibility of excluding others from using your economic good. This is crucial in order to have 
a favorable climate for innovation within an economy. Because the marginal cost is close to 
zero, there would be no innovation taking place without the possibility of excluding others from 
utilizing the idea. A functioning system of patenting and a strict enforcement of patent laws is 
therefore important. Technological progress can be vulnerable to corruption in the following 
sense. Corrupt officials demanding bribes against issuing patents or weak protection of patents 
by the authorities will imply that the potential profits from new innovations are reduced. If 
widespread corruption reduces the expected payoff for innovation, it can reduce the growth rate 
of TFP. Subsequently, growth in GDP can be affected considerably.  
 
2.2.2 The endogenous model 
The endogenous growth model begins with the same standard framework as the neoclassical 
one. However, there are some adjustments, which is shown in equation (2) and (3) below. These 
are based on the Romer model and gathered from Roland (2016).  
 









= 𝛿𝐿𝐴𝑡 (3) 
 
Equation (2) is the production of final goods. The TFP term is now time indexed and put 
together with the labor term, making the equation (1) a labor augmented production function. 
The labor term is now indexed LYt, reflecting the amount of the labor force working in the goods 
sector. The total amount of labor is Lt=LYt+LAt, where LAt is the amount of labor working in 
R&D. Equation (3) defines the growth rate of TFP and states that technology growth depends 
on the amount of labor in the R&D sector multiplied with 𝛿, which represents the efficiency of 
research in producing ideas. In this model, the stock of knowledge increases over time. If the 
stock is large, the additional knowledge next period will be higher than if the stock was small. 
An implication from this is that the economy will experience increasing returns to scale 
according to the model (Roland, 2016). Technology therefore plays an important role as it can 
allow for high growth in GDP per capita, even in the long run. Differences in economic growth 
between countries can then be thought to stem from differences in technology. In light of this 
implication and the discussion from section 2.2.1, a functioning innovative environment is 
crucial for generating economic growth.  
 
Empirically, TFP has been found to be the most important driver of economic growth (Bauer, 
1990; Hall & Jones, 1999; Jones, 2016; Lagos, 2006). According to Hall and Jones (1999) 
formulation, output per worker is determined by three factors: capital intensity (K/Y), human 
capital per worker and TFP. The authors show that a large part of the differences in output per 
worker between countries is explained by the differences in the contribution from TFP. 
Countries like Kenya and India had only a fraction of that of the level in USA, while physical 
and human capital levels were only slightly smaller (Hall & Jones, 1999). This substantiates 
the importance of technological growth.  
 
2.3 Growth accounting 
This section will decompose a modified version of the production function, to derive a model 
which will serve as a baseline for the econometric model in section 4. It is inspired by the 
growth accounting exercise done by Jones (2016). It starts off with a slightly modified version 




 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐴𝑡𝑀𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡, 𝐻𝑡) = [𝐴𝑡𝑀𝑡]𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐻𝑡
1−𝛼, 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] (4) 
 
 𝐻𝑡 = 𝐿𝑡𝑒
𝜙(𝐸𝑑𝑡) (5) 
 
In equation (4), the term in brackets is the TFP. At represents the technology level and Mt 
represent every other factor which could impact TFP. Ht is human capital augmented labor, 
where Edt is the average years of education in the labor force. The parameter ϕ represents the 
productivity level of labor with Edt years of education. This is relative to those with no 
education. In order to decompose the expression, each side of equation (1) is divided by 𝑌𝑡
𝛼 and 
rearranged to obtain equation (6). 
 




















Here, Kt/Yt is the capital-output ratio which is roughly proportional to the investment rate in 
the long run (Hall & Jones, 1999; Jones, 2016). The TFP term is gathered into Zt, which is 
displayed in equation (7). The capital-output ratio is usually independent of TFP in the long run 
(Ahsan & Ahsan, 2018). Further, by dividing each side of equation (6) with Lt, one obtains an 
expression for GDP per capita, which is displayed in equation (8). 
 








Here, yt ≡ Yt/Lt is GDP per capita and ht ≡ Ht/Lt is human capital per unit of labor. From the 
expression, it can be seen that yt depends on capital intensity, human capital and TFP. Equation 














The terms here are the growth rates of the different variables, gXt=[(1/Xt)/(dXt/dt)] where X≡ 
[y, K/Y, h, Z] and KY is the capital output ratio. Growth in GDP per capita, y, is then determined 
by the growth rates in the capital-output ratio, growth in human capital and growth in TFP. The 
model then allows for differences in economic growth to be determined by differences in one 
of these three factors. It then provides a convenient framework for exploring and discussing the 
factors that drive differences in economic growth.  
 
If institutional quality and corruption have an impact on growth, these must work through the 
components of growth, namely K/Y, h and Z. As discussed in section 2.1, TFP is thought to be 
the main driver of economic growth in the long run. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate 
the causes behind differences across in this factor. Inspired by the paper “Corruption and 
Economic Growth” by Pak Hung Mo (2001), the transmission channel can be mathematically 




𝑍(𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝜗) (10) 
 
Equation (10) simply states that the growth rate in TFP is a function of corruption and other 
influencing factors, 𝜗. These other influencing factors will be discussed in detail in section 4. 
In summary, the model provides a framework in which differences in economic growth can be 
explored. Corruption, institutional quality and other factors that could influence growth, enters 
the model through the transmission channels, which are the different components present in 
equation (9). Especially the effects they might have on growth in TFP is interesting. The next 





3 Institutions, corruption and growth 
This section will discuss institutions and corruption, and what role these may play in economic 
growth and development. The concepts will be defined and explained in light of the economic 
theory presented in the previous section. As discussed, TFP is arguably the most important 
component in economic growth (Bauer, 1990; Hall & Jones, 1999; Hsieh & Klenow, 2010; 
Huang & Yuan, 2021; Islam & McGillivray, 2020; Jones, 2016; Klenow & Rodriguez-Clare, 
1997; Roland, 2016). Special attention will therefore be paid into exploring the possible 
relationship that may exist between corruption and technological development. Finally, the 
section will include a discussion of previous literature on the subject.  
 
3.1 Institutions 
Institutions is defined by Nobel laureate Douglas North as constraints designed by humans to 
shape and restrict human behavior (North, 1990). These constraints guide how people interact 
and behave, like following the traffic rules or showing up on time at work. Institutions can be 
thought of as the game rules in a society (North, 1992). Primarily, institutions contribute to 
society and the economy by lowering transaction costs (North, 1992). There are two kinds of 
institutions: formal and informal. The former encompasses rules that are written down, and the 
latter addresses the social norms that dictate how people should behave (Casson, Della Giusta, 
& Kambhampati, 2010; Ruiter, 2001). Formal and informal institutions have intricate 
interactions and the latter usually reflect the cultural and social norms prevailing in a society 
(Roland, 2016; Tabellini, 2008). Democracy is a type of political institution that falls in the 
category of formal institutions (Roland, 2016). It has been found to positively influence growth, 
as it enhances governance and subsequently institutional quality (Rivera‐Batiz, 2002). Further, 
law enforcement, regulations, judicial system, governance, monetary/fiscal institutions and tax 
administration has been identified in the literature as institutions that affects growth (Siddiqui 
& Ahmed, 2013). Institutions is argued by some economists to be one of the key reasons as to 
why some countries have developed more than others (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002; 
Baland, Moene, & Robinson, 2010; North, 1990). There has been much research on the topic, 
and the evidence suggests that there is a strong causal link from institutions to growth (see for 
example, Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001). It has been argued that it affects growth 
through property rights, transaction costs and incentive structures (Mauro, 1995; North & 
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Thomas, 1973). By lowering transaction costs and increasing trust, good institutions can 
channel resources towards activities with high returns (Shirley, 2005).  
 
In relation to the discussion in section 2.2.1, institutions evidently have an important function. 
For a country to have functioning innovative environment, solid institutions need to be in place 
(Tebaldi, 2016). Institutions that handle property rights are especially important in this context 
(Chen & Puttitanun, 2005). Firstly, patent issuing office needs to function properly. If there is 
too much difficulty in obtaining patents, the innovators may be discouraged and cease the 
process (David, 1993). Secondly, subsequent to actually obtaining a patent, it is necessary for 
the agents to have confidence in the institutions that enforce the property right laws. Suppose, 
an innovator, after having incurred large R&D expenditures, has obtained a patent on a new 
idea/innovation. This does not automatically imply that the innovator will earn monopoly 
profits, if the competitors are allowed to copy the innovation without consequences (Chen & 
Puttitanun, 2005; Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010). This violates the excludability criteria, 
and would lower a country’s TFP and economic growth (Olson, Sarna, & Swamy, 2000). 
Higher quality institutions therefore stimulate technological progress (Tebaldi, 2016). In 
relation to equation (10), it thus enters with a positive sign. Improved institutional quality 
should facilitate innovative activity, raising the TFP growth rate, gZ. Subsequently, growth in 
output, gY, should increase. Remembering that differences in TFP explain the major part of 
productivity differences between poor and rich countries, institutional quality seems to be one 




In light of the economic theory from the prior section, institutions enter equation (9) through its 
impact on either gKY, gh or gZ. Concerning the capital-output ratio, or the investment rate, higher 
quality of institutions in a country should ease the process of doing business (Gwartney, 
Holcombe, & Lawson, 2006). Strong protection of property rights is especially important 
(Mauro, 1995). This should affect economic growth (gY) positively by increasing the 
investment rate, gKY. Further, higher institutional quality increases the expected return on 
investments in human capital (Dias & Tebaldi, 2012). This affects growth through two 
channels. Firstly, the higher returns induce workers to attain more education, making each unit 
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of labor more productive (Black & Lynch, 1996). According to the model, gh would then rise 
which causes gY to rise. Secondly, increased human capital give rise to more R&D (Del Mar 
Salinas-Jiménez & Salinas-Jiménez, 2011; Dias & Tebaldi, 2012; Miller & Upadhyay, 2000). 




Corruption is potentially a key driver behind divergences in economic growth (Mauro, 1995). 
In light of the economic model derived in section two, corruption can only influence growth 
through its impact on either investment, human capital or TFP. There are several different 
channels through which corruption can affect these three (Mo, 2001).  
 
3.2.1 Corruption and institutions 
Corruption is defined by the World Bank as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (World 
Bank, 2020), and it is a widely used definition in economic literature. Although the definition 
does not include all occurrences of corruption, like corruption in the private sector, it does 
provide a good framework. Common activities that are usually considered corrupt consist of 
bribery, patronage agreements, misuse of power or authority, as well as favoritism when 
contracts are awarded (Jain & Jain, 1998). It can occur as grand corruption or petty corruption 
(Mashali, 2012). An example of the first one is firms paying a politician for him or her not to 
support legislation that could be harmful to the firm. Petty corruption could be a bureaucrat 
accepting payment for issuing licenses or speeding up the bureaucratic process of issuing one 
for the paying party. Since corruption is inherently illegal, the acts are most often conducted in 
secrecy (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000). Corrupt acts are consequently difficult to reveal/expose 
(Roland, 2016). Corruption can be pernicious in that they can undermine laws, regulation and 
the general function of institutions (Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005). This aspect of 
corruption is encompassed in the economic model and equation (9) and (10) through its 
influence on institutional quality. Political institutions and corruption seem to have a strong link 
(Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010; Jetter, Agudelo, & Hassan, 2015). Generally, countries with a 
more authoritarian rule seem to have a higher level of corruption (Rivera‐Batiz, 2002). This 
link can be attributed to the fact that more political competition make politicians more 
vulnerable to public pressure (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). If they are perceived as corrupt or get 
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caught, they can be voted out of office. The concept of corruption is an important factor to 
explore when investigating the causes of divergences in economic growth between countries, 
as it seems to weaken institutions.  
 
3.2.2 Corruption – efficient or detrimental? 
There are two opposing views in the economic literature on how corruption affects economic 
growth (Huang & Yuan, 2021; Lee, Wang, & Ho, 2020; Mauro, 1995). The first one states that 
corruption might have a positive effect on growth and is usually referred to as the “greasing the 
wheels” hypothesis (Aidt, 2019). The essence of the argument is that when there are many 
bureaucratic instances before a license or permit is finally issued, a payment to one of the public 
officials could speed up the process. This is especially prevalent in countries with inefficient 
institutions (Nur-tegin & Jakee, 2020). Corruption could therefore reduce bureaucratic 
inefficiency and raise the investment rate (Méon & Sekkat, 2005). The second view, often 
referred to as the “sanding the wheel” hypothesis, stands in opposition to the efficiency 
argument and states that corruption will cause inefficiency (Aidt, 2019). According to this 
argument, corrupt officials are often unpredictable and may behave arbitrarily. For example, 
instead of providing services, as agreed upon, in return for a bribe, they may delay their work 
(of issuing permits, etc.) in order to extract additional bribes (Aidt, 2019; Roland, 2016). This 
could add uncertainty to the investment climate. In relation to investment, corruption could 
reduce the expected returns from an investment, especially long irreversible ones (Campos et 
al., 1999). Imagine an investor having bribed a public official to issue a permit for the 
construction of a mall. Once the mall has been built, there is no simple way of reversing the 
investment without incurring losses. Knowing this, the official can extract large bribes and the 
return on the investment would be reduced for the mall builder. This could lead investors to 
pursue more reversable, but less profitable projects (Aidt, 2019). This would reduce the gKY 
term and subsequently gY. There has been much research on the topic, and the results appear to 
suggest that the latter, more pessimistic view of corruption is the most plausible one (Mauro, 
1995; Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Nur-tegin & Jakee, 2020). However, some evidence has been 
found that support the notion that corruption facilitates certain types of transactions 
(Mahagaonkar, 2008; Nur-tegin & Jakee, 2020). For example, Campos et al. (1999) found 
evidence in favor of “greasing the wheels” hypothesis in the Southeast Asian countries. This is 
in contrast to Sub-Saharan Africa, where corruption is thought to have a strong detrimental 
effect (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Lambsdorff & Cornelius, 2000; Mahagaonkar, 2008). 
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Section 4 will explore empirically into this contrasting empirical outcomes for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Southeast Asia.  
 
One last note is that there is a possible endogeneity problem (Mauro, 1995). While corruption 
possibly has a negative impact on economic growth, it could also be the case that low economic 
growth breeds corruption. Civil servants with low income could be tempted to engage in corrupt 
activities in order to increase their meager income, meaning low economic growth could be a 
source for corruption. In other words, there is possibly a bidirectional causality between 
corruption and poverty (Mauro, 1995; Roland, 2016).  
 
3.2.3 Corruption and innovation 
TFP is, as argued by Hall and Jones (1999) and others, the most important factor in explaining 
differences in economic growth between countries. TFP reflects the technological level within 
an economy and it is therefore interesting to examine how corruption might affect the process 
of innovation and technological progress. Firstly, widespread corruption could distort the rule 
of law and thereby weaken the institutions that are needed to enforce patent laws (DiRienzo & 
Das, 2015). This would weaken the incentives to innovate and corruption would enter as a 
negative effect in equation (10), reducing gZ (DiRienzo & Das, 2015). An implication from this 
is that potential innovators may now spend their time and resources on rent seeking activities 
instead of innovation (Del Mar Salinas-Jiménez & Salinas-Jiménez, 2011). Secondly, there is 
also another misallocation of resources as time and money is used on paying bribes instead of 
on other productive activities (Aidt, 2019). Thirdly, innovators faced with excessive corruption 
could enter the informal sector of the economy where there is less productive technology, or 
become corrupt bureaucrats themselves (Roland, 2016). Fourthly, corrupt politicians could 
spend monetary foreign aid earmarked for R&D on other more politically popular policies 
(Mungui-Pippidi, 2015). Lastly, corruption can be thought to have a negative effect on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) due to more uncertainty and lower expected returns (Al-Sadig, 2009). 
FDI is believed to have positive spill-over effects on the host country technology (AlAzzawi, 
2012). Corruption can therefore have a negative indirect influence on innovation through its 
effect on FDI. All these different ways corruption can affect innovation enters into equation 
(10) with a negative sign, lowering gZ. Subsequently, from equation (9), economic growth 




3.3 Other factors 
The level of corruption within a country could be a reflection of the prevailing culture in that 
country (Barr & Serra, 2010). Corrupt acts are often thought of as morally wrong. However, 
this may not apply uniformly to all countries and across all cultures. Certain acts or behaviors 
which are considered corrupt in one culture may not be viewed similarly in other cultures. 
Corrupt acts could be a result from deliberate evaluation of the benefits and costs arising from 
the act, or it could be the result of intrinsic motivation (Barr & Serra, 2010). This motivation 
stems from the traditions, values and social norms which prevails in a society. When certain 
corrupt acts have their roots in the society’s cultural values, it may prove to be difficult to 
control these corrupt acts. Like cultural values, people’s attitude to corruption may take a long 
time to change. This explains why corruption has long staying power in some countries (Barr 
& Serra, 2010).  
 
3.4 Empirical overview of institutions, growth and TFP 
There are numerous empirical studies that have attempted to find links between institutions, 
corruption and growth. This section will give an overview over some literature on the subject. 
Firstly, studies on the link between institutions, corruption and growth will be presented. 
Studies on institutions, corruption and innovation will follow thereafter. 
 
Mauro (1995) wrote an interesting paper entitled “Corruption and Growth”. This is an 
influential paper which has inspired a great deal of further research on economic growth and 
corruption. He explored the relationship between corruption, GDP and investment, using a 
dataset consisting of 58 countries. The dependent variable used was investment to GDP for the 
period 1960-1985 and corruption indices from Business International as independent variables. 
He also addressed the endogeneity problem by using IV-regression with an index of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization as instrument. His results showed that corruption has a 
negative effect on GDP and investment (Mauro, 1995).  
 
Gründler and Potrafke (2019) wrote a paper entitled “Corruption and economic growth: New 
empirical evidence”, using a dynamic panel data regression to study the effects of corruption 
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on economic growth. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is used as a measure of corruption 
for a sample of 175 countries. In their paper, they included a critical review of earlier empirical 
studies which had used CPI as a variable in their analysis. The index, which is developed and 
released yearly by Transparency International, was reconstructed in 2012. A new methodology 
was applied to improve the accuracy of the corruption measure as well as it’s comparability 
across countries. According to the authors, the new methodology has made the index 
incomparable over time periods before and after 2012. Therefore, one cannot use the index 
values before and after the new methodology was employed. They argue that earlier studies 
have ignored this. Consequently, much of the literature is flawed. Gründler and Potrafke have 
therefore limited their dataset to only include observations from after 2012. They use a dynamic 
panel regression approach, lagging the CPI variable. Their result shows a negative relationship 
between corruption and growth. This effect seems to be larger for autocracies compared to non-
autocracies. Further, they state that the effect of corruption is transmitted to economic growth 
through decreasing FDI and increasing inflation (Gründler & Potrafke, 2019).  
 
“The effect of institutions on economic growth: A global analysis based on GMM dynamic 
panel estimation” is a paper by Siddiqui and Ahmed (2013). They study how the quality of 
institutions affect economic growth. By using over 30 different indices for institutional quality, 
they employ generalized method of moments estimation (GMM) and panel ordinary least 
square (OLS) estimation. Their findings suggest that stronger institutions have a positive effect 
on economic growth.  
 
Rivera‐Batiz (2002) wrote the paper “Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory 
and Evidence”. He explored how democracy and governance affected economic growth in the 
long run. By laying out a theoretical groundwork, he derived a regression baseline which is 
quite similar to equation (9) discussed above. The data used was gathered from the Penn World 
Tables, which is also the dataset used in this thesis. He also emphasized the importance of TFP 
and studied how it is affected by democracy and governance. In contrast with the analysis done 
in this paper, only two time periods were employed by Rivera-Batiz, 1990 and 1960. The 
variables he used are measured as the average change between these time periods, essentially 
making the analysis a cross section study. He found that democracy has a significant positive 




Pak Hung Mo (2000) found a significant negative effect of corruption on economic growth, 
using cross country data. He used CPI as the independent variable and growth in total GDP as 
the dependent variable. The method used is ordinary least squares estimation. In relation to this 
paper, the framework is similar. His empirical substructure is based on a growth accounting 
exercise which yields an estimation equation close to the one derived in equation (9). The main 
difference is that total GDP is used instead of GDP per capita. He included initial GDP per 
capita as an independent variable to capture convergence, as predicted by the neoclassical 
theory. This variable is found to have a significant negative coefficient, which means the result 
favors the convergence hypothesis (Mo, 2001).  
 
A study that looked at the relationship between corruption and innovation is “Innovation and 
role of corruption and diversity: A cross-country study”, written by DiRienzo and Das (2015). 
They used cross-country data to explore the relationship, and they included measures of cultural 
and religious diversity in the model. They emphasized the importance of innovation for 
economic growth and the lack of empirical research on cross-country analysis on the subject. 
In their study, the Global Innovation Index and CPI were used as proxies for innovation and 
corruption, respectively. The regression equation is similar to the one derived in this paper. The 
regression results showed that corruption has a significant negative effect on innovation. 
However, this effect is smaller for wealthier countries (DiRienzo & Das, 2015). 
 
Another paper that studied the relationship between corruption and innovation is “Country 
governance, corruption, and the likelihood of firms’ innovation”, written by Lee et al. (2020). 
The data used is firm level and is collected from the World Bank Enterprise Survey and consists 
of a sample of firms for the period 2006-2016. They used the World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) from the World Bank as measurement of institutional quality. Three different aspects of 
bribery are used as a proxy for corruption: frequency, depth and incidence. Interestingly, they 
found that the sectors in the economy with the worst governance are more vulnerable to 
corruption and the effect is larger. This includes e.g., the manufacturing sector. In summary, 
corruption seems to affect innovation negatively at the firm-level and better governance 




Another study that analyzed innovation and corruption using cross-country data is 
“Entrepreneurship, innovation and corruption” by Anokhin and Schulze (2009). They used data 
from 64 countries to analyze whether controlling for corruption increases innovation and 
entrepreneurship. One of the indicators from the WGI dataset, control of corruption, was used 
as a proxy for the level of corruption. This is the same corruption index which is used in this 
paper. Similar to Gründler and Potrafke, they emphasize on foreign direct investment and the 
role it plays. They find that a better control of corruption is associated with higher levels of 
innovation. This relationship is also found to be non-linear. They also find that FDI mitigates 
these effects. According to their results, institutional factors play a crucial role as to whether or 
not there will be innovative activity within a country. In an economy where institutional factors 
are non-existing, there will be no innovative activity (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009).  
 
“Does political corruption impede firm innovation? Evidence from the United states” is a paper 
by Huang and Yuan (2021) that studies innovation and corruption in the US at the industry-
level. His regressions were performed with OLS estimation and he include industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effect to address heterogeneity bias. The baseline equation is quite similar to the 
one used in this paper in both form and the fact that fixed effects are included. However, it does 
not include variables such as FDI and human capital. They find that corruption have a 
significant negative impact on innovation (Huang & Yuan, 2021).  
 
4 Data, measures and methodology 
This paper seeks to explore why there are such large variations in economic growth across 
countries. Section 2 and 3 have elaborated on the different factors that influence economic 
growth. The following section will go through the data that has been used in the analysis. All 
the data consists of yearly observations for each country. The timeframes of the different 
variables vary. Therefore, the timeframe is based on available observations from the corruption 
index that is used. Countries with large numbers of missing observations have been left out. In 
total, the dataset includes observations from 170 different countries over a time period of 17 




Two models will be estimated. One for growth in GDP per capita and another for growth in 
TFP. For growth in GDP per capita, the estimating model comes from the growth accounting 
exercise done in section 2.3, making equation (9) the basis for the estimating model. From the 
equation, per capita growth has been decomposed into three constituent parts: growth in K/Y, 
growth in per capita human capital and growth in technology. Variables that explain these 
growth terms will therefore be included in the estimating model. The estimating model for the 
growth rate in TFP/technology is based on the ad-hoc equation (10), an approach inspired by 
Mo (2001). This model will then include variables that affect technological progress within a 
country.  
 
4.1 Data and measures 
In what follows, a list of both the dependent and the independent variables is presented, along 
with their definition and rationale for why these are included in the estimating model. 
Descriptive statistics will also be presented.  
 
4.1.1 Dependent variables 
Two dependent variables are used in this analysis, one for each model. These are (i) the growth 
rate in GDP per capita and (ii) growth rate in technology/TFP. There are several different 
measurements of GDP. Real GDP is the appropriate measure in this cross-country study, as it 
is comparable across countries. It is gathered from the Penn World Tables and is measured in 
constant 2017 national prices (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015). The variable is transformed 
to per capita form by dividing real GDP by the total number of employed citizens. Using the 
fact that changes in logarithmic values can be interpreted as percentage changes, the variable is 
operationalized as the first difference of the logarithmic values of real GDP per capita, which 
is approximately equal to gy from equation (9). This is a common approach in the literature 
concerning economic growth (see for example, Hasan & Tucci, 2010).  
 
TFP is calculated by using the growth function similar to equation (1), TFP= Y/(KαL1-α). Y is 
the real GDP per capita from the paragraph above. K is the real capital stock, measured in 
constant 2017 national prices, and L is the labor force. Both are obtained from the World Penn 
Tables. The term α is the capital share, and is set to 0,3, which is widely thought to be an 
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appropriate level (Feenstra et al., 2015; Sørensen & Whitta-Jacobsen, 2010). This approach is 
also used in Islam and McGillivray (2020). Using the same procedure as with growth in real 
GDP per capita, the TFP variable is operationalized as the first difference of its natural 
logarithm, which approximately equals gZ from equation (9) and (10). As discussed, TFP can 
be used as a proxy for technological progress within a country. It must be noted that TFP is 
calculated as a residual. The measures’ accuracy is therefore dependent on how accurate the 
capital stock and labor share are measured. For some countries, especially less developed 
countries with missing data, such accuracy is often not the case (Islam & McGillivray, 2020).  
 
4.1.2 Independent variables 
The estimated model for growth in GDP per capita is, as discussed, based on equation (9), from 
section 2.3. The equation states that growth in GDP per capita is determined by growth in K/Y, 
human capital and technology. Variables that influence these factors should be included in the 
estimation model. For the corruption variable, the Control of Corruption index (cce), is a 
corruption index obtained from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset, developed by 
the World Bank. It is a subjective measure of corruption, with data for each country since 1996. 
In the beginning it was only released every two years, so observations from 1997, 1999 and 
2001 are absent. The index is constructed by using more than 30 underlying sources, based on 
expert assessments and survey perceptions (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). The cce 
index takes values in the interval -2,5 and 2,5. Low values indicate high levels of corruption. 
For easier interpretation, the index has been reversed, meaning that an increase in cce indicates 
higher levels of corruption. This approach was inspired by Gründler and Potrafke (2019). 
Further, this variable has been transformed to only take positive values, x∈[0,5]. On the high 
end of the scale with high levels of corruption, one then typically find countries in Africa, Asia 
and South-America. On the low end of the scale, one typically find western countries. Another 
widely used corruption index is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) developed by 
Transparency International (see for example, DiRienzo and Das, 2015). In 2012, the 
methodology used in constructing the index was changed. It is therefore not possible to compare 
CPI rankings from before and after 2012 (Gründler & Potrafke, 2019). Due to this fact, the cce 
index was preferred over CPI. One must note that the index is a subjective one. Although it is 
based on several different sources, which should increase the accuracy of the measure, it is still 
exposed to subjective bias. The survey participants could perceive countries that perform badly 
economically as more corrupt, even though that might not be the case (Roland, 2016). Even 
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though the index may be subject to bias, it is still more comprehensive than other objective 
measures of corruption and will serve as an appropriate proxy.  
 
In order to capture the convergence hypothesis, it is customary to include a measure of “initial 
GDP per capita” as an independent variable in the estimation of the per capita growth of GDP 
(see for example, Hasan & Tucci, 2010; Mo, 2001; Rivera-Batiz, 2002). Considering that a 
large initial value of GDP per capita (indicating a rich country) should mean lower rate of 
growth for that country, such a variable would capture this effect. However, this study applies 
ordinary least squares (OLS), using fixed effects transformation. An implication of this is that 
all time-invariant terms/variables drop out of the regression model. To control for this problem, 
a variable need to be added that varies over time and also captures the same effect. Lagged GDP 
per capita is such a variable (Islam & McGillivray, 2020). If the convergence hypothesis is true, 
then countries with large “initial” values of GDP per capita should have a lower growth rate 
than countries with small “initial” values of GDP per capita. The lagged natural logarithm of 
real GDP per capita is therefore added.  
 
The estimating model for growth in technology/TFP is an ad-hoc model based on the 
formulation in equation (10), which follows Mo (2001). Variables that affect the technological 
progress in a country should be included in this model. These are factors that affects R&D 
efforts. The cce index will be used in this model as well, to capture the effect of corruption on 
growth in TFP. Lagged TFP is used instead of lagged GDP per capita in this model. By 
including this, Romer’s hypothesis of higher technological growth for rich countries can be 
evaluated. Production of new technology is thought to be an important source for growth. 
However, technology can also be imported. This is especially important for poor countries, 
where innovating activities can be small or perhaps even non-existing. A more open economy 
could allow for more import of technology. A greater inflow of FDI could also bring about a 
higher technological growth rate in poor countries. It follows from equation (9) that variables 
that enter the estimating model for growth in TFP will naturally enter the model for growth in 
real GDP per capita, but not necessarily the other way around. However, lagged TFP will only 





4.1.3 Control variables 
Following, a brief review of control variables will be presented. Firstly, the control variables 
that are only included in the model for growth in real GDP per capita is discussed. Secondly, 
the variables that are included in both models are discussed. Inflation is a variable that is usually 
controlled for in economic growth literature (see for example, Islam & McGillivray, 2020). 
Corrupt government may raise the government expenditure (fiscal policy) just before elections, 
in order to get more votes. Such expenditure could even include paying bribes to influential 
people or simply cash hand-out to the constituents. Higher expenditure could simply raise 
inflation. Further, inflation could enter the growth equation through its impact on investment. 
High inflation means returns from investments become more uncertain, creating a bad 
investment climate. Population growth is also added as a control, as it can influence growth in 
GDP per capita through other channels than just increasing the denominator in Y/L. For 
example, larger families could hamper the formation of human capital (Rosenzweig, 1988). In 
relation to equation (9), a measure capital-intensity will be included. The growth rate in capital 
per worker will be included as a proxy for investment. It is obtained from the Penn World 
Tables as well.  
 
Next, variables that appear in both models will be discussed. A proxy for human capital is 
added, as it raises worker productivity, which subsequently should increase economic growth. 
Further, human capital is complementary to R&D, which can increase innovation. This results 
in more TFP and more growth. The variable is an index based on average years of schooling 
and the returns to education (Feenstra et al., 2015). It is also obtained from the Penn World 
Tables. Trade openness is another variable that could influence growth and technological 
progress, since much technology can be imported, as discussed. More openness also positively 
affect FDI inflows (Liargovas & Skandalis, 2012). Much of technological progress in a country 
occurs through FDI spillovers (Alfaro, Kalemli‐Ozcan, & Sayek, 2009). The openness is 
measured as the sum of exports and imports as share of GDP, and is widely used as a control 
variable in literature (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009; Gründler & Potrafke, 2019). Trade openness 
and FDI are both collected from the World Bank (2021). FDI is measured as the natural 
logarithm. As discussed in the previous section, the level of democracy could also influence 
both GDP and corruption (DiRienzo & Das, 2015). A measure of democracy is obtained from 
a democracy index developed by Gründler and Krieger. They have used machine learning to 
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get precise measures on the level of democracy in different countries. The index is continuous 
in the interval 0 to 1 (Gründler & Krieger, 2016).  
 
Variables for governance and institutional quality are the remaining indicators in the WGI 
dataset, and will be included to analyze whether the effect of corruption varies with institutional 
quality and governance. These are Voice and Accountability (vae), Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence and Terrorism (pve), Government Effectiveness (gee), Regulatory Quality 
(rqe) and Rule of Law (rle). They are constructed the same way as the cce indicator, and only 
take values between -2,5 and 2,5. As before, they are transformed to only take positive values, 
x∈[0,5], for easier interpretation. These are not reversed, so high scores indicate good 
governance and good institutional quality and lower scores indicate bad performance. The first 
one, Voice and Accountability, is a measure of the degree of freedom a country’s citizens have, 
to participate in elections. It also includes to what degree freedom of expression and association, 
as well as free media is present. Political Stability and Absence of Violence measures the 
likelihood that a country will experience political instability, violence motivated by political 
reasons, as well as terrorism. Government effectiveness reflects the quality of a country’s public 
and civil services and how independent it is from political pressure. Further, it captures how 
well policies are formulated and implemented and how credible the government is perceived in 
undergoing those policies. Regulatory Quality is a proxy for how well the government does in 
formulating and implementing policies and regulations that encourages and stimulates 
development in the private sector. Rule of Law captures the confidence citizens and other 
economic agents have in the prevailing laws and rules of the society, and to what degree they 
follow them (Kaufmann et al., 2011). As with the cce indicators, they lack observations for 
1997, 1999 and 2001. Since the dependent variables are measured as first differences, every 
year before 2002 is left out of the dataset.  
 
4.1.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays a summarize of descriptive statistics for the relevant variables. Most of them 
have observations around 3000. The mean growth rate in real GDP per capita is 0,017, which 
implies that countries on average grows by 1,7% each year. The standard deviation is at 4,8%, 
meaning that there is a large variation in growth rates. This can also be seen with the large 
difference in the minimum and maximum values. The picture is similar for the TFP growth rate, 
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although the mean growth rate is somewhat lower at 1,2% average each year. The corruption 
index, cce, has a mean value of 2,513. Remembering that cce takes values between 0 and 5, 
where the high end represents high levels of corruption, countries seem to have scores ranging 
in the middle of the index. The standard deviation along with the minimum and maximum 
values seem to indicate substantial variation in corruption levels between countries. Average 
scores for the remaining five governance indicators are spread around 2,5.  
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 GDPPC growth 2890 .017 .048 -.455 .457 
 TFP growth 2873 .012 .044 -.449 .457 
 cce 3060 2.513 1.013 .03 4.326 
 K/L growth 2873 .018 .036 -.133 .24 
 Pop growth 2890 .015 .016 -.045 .175 
 HC 2574 2.53 .693 1.088 4.352 
 Inflation 2805 5.387 8.712 -30.243 254.949 
 Trade 2837 .898 .563 .002 4.426 
 Democracy 2986 .689 .349 0 1 
 FDI 3024 .067 .611 -.672 20.009 
 LnGDPPCt-1 2890 10.182 1.122 6.744 12.227 
 LnTFPt-1 2873 6.722 .752 3.796 8.294 
 vae 3054 2.449 .967 .241 4.301 
 pve 3056 2.423 .937 -.681 4.255 
 gee 3057 2.539 .981 .221 4.937 
 rqe 3057 2.552 .957 .136 4.761 
 rle 3060 2.47 .983 .178 4.6 
Table 1 – GDPPC and TFP growth is the first difference of their logarithmic values. 
 
 
Table 2 displays a correlation matrix. Growth in GDP per capita and TFP are seen to have a 
strong positive correlation. In light of the economic theory in section 2, this seems reasonable. 
Interestingly, corruption (cce) is positively correlated with growth in both GDP per capita and 
TFP, at around 0,133 and 0,107 respectively. There are some reasons why this positive 
correlation is observed. These will be discussed in section 5. Human capital show negative 
correlations with growth in TFP and GDP per capita. However, growth in capital has a positive 
correlation with cce, while human capital does not. Trade, democracy and FDI has negative 





Table 2: Correlation matrix  
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12) 
 (1) GDPPC growth 1.000 
 (2) TFP growth 0.963 1.000 
 (3) cce 0.133 0.107 1.000 
 (4) K/L growth 0.461 0.204 0.132 1.000 
 (5) Pop growth -0.142 -0.143 0.241 -0.044 1.000 
 (6) HC -0.089 -0.043 -0.662 -0.178 -0.492 1.000 
 (7) Inflation 0.028 0.021 0.369 0.033 0.147 -0.303 1.000 
 (8) Trade 0.003 0.038 -0.313 -0.112 -0.068 0.304 -0.158 1.000 
 (9) Democracy 0.028 0.077 -0.383 -0.152 -0.452 0.447 -0.182 0.022 1.000 
 (10) FDI -0.031 -0.038 -0.158 0.009 -0.040 0.084 -0.063 0.263 0.093 1.000 
 (11) LnGDPPCt-1 -0.212 -0.176 -0.715 -0.189 -0.268 0.772 -0.339 0.312 0.232 0.109 1.000 
 (12) LnTFPt-1 -0.201 -0.183 -0.702 -0.128 -0.217 0.734 -0.350 0.291 0.192 0.097 0.983 1.000 




The regressions in this analysis are all done using the statistical software program, Stata. Firstly, 
the different datasets were combined. Some observations did not match with each other and 
were subsequently dropped. As mentioned earlier, some countries had a severe lack of 
observations. They were therefore dropped, as they may lead to misleading and/or biased 
results. All years that did not include any observations for cce were also dropped. Next, the 
variables measured in million dollars, real GDP and the capital stock, were transformed to the 
actual amount of dollars. As discussed, the GDP per capita and TFP terms were transformed 
into growth rates using natural logarithms, and cce is reversed for easier interpretation 
(Gründler & Potrafke, 2019).  
 
Because the dataset is a panel dataset, one can use different types of panel regressions in order 
to get more accurate estimates than if no panel regressions are used. Although there are several 
control variables included, it is plausible that there still are some unobserved factors that could 
affect the dependent variable. In particular, there could be unobserved, time invariant factors 
which are specific to a location, referred to as individual heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2014). If 
this is not corrected for, the regression results could be biased. This is done by transforming the 





 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,170 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1,2, … ,17 (11) 
 
yit is the dependent variable, and stands for either growth in GDP per capita or growth in TFP. 
Cit is the cce corruption index with its coefficient, γ. xit’ is a vector of the control variables with 
the corresponding coefficients, β. The set of control variables depends, as discussed, on whether 
growth in GDP per capita or growth in TFP is being used as the dependent variable. αi is the set 
of country specific effects that does not vary over time, or country fixed effects. These are 
factors that change slowly over time relative to other factors, and can be viewed as constants 
over time, e.g., culture and geography. These are specific to each country and are thought to 
have an effect on the dependent variable. This is the term that captures the unobserved 
heterogeneity. In light of the discussion in section 3.3, this seems important to control for. εit is 
an idiosyncratic error term. To remove the effect of αi out of the results, fixed effects estimations 
is applied. This is done by undertaking the within transformation, or fixed effects 
transformation (Wooldridge, 2014). Firstly, a new equation is set up where equation (11) is 




=  𝛾𝐶𝑖 +  𝑥𝑖
′
𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖 (12) 
 
αi does not have a time subscript, t, and will therefore not have a time average. It will therefore 
show up in both equation (11) and (12). The term can be removed by subtracting equation (12) 
from equation (11). This is done in equation (13).  
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖 =  𝛾(𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖) + (𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ − 𝑥𝑖
′
)𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 (13) 
 
By rearranging, the model can be expressed as equation (14). 
 
 ?̃?𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾?̃?𝑖𝑡 +  ?̃?𝑖𝑡








 and ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 is the time demeaned 
data on y, C, x’ and ε respectively. The individual (or country-wise) heterogeneity term, αi, has 
been removed. This implies that an OLS regression can be done on equation (14), which in turn 
can produce unbiased estimations. Alternatively, another similar approach could be used called 
random effect estimation. One would use this if the unobserved heterogeneity is thought to be 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. In this case of the present estimation, such an 
assumption seems not very plausible. In order to check which assumption is valid, a series of 
Hausman-tests were performed. They all rejected the null hypothesis (which is that the random 
effects estimates are consistent and efficient) by a large margin, which indicates that fixed 
effects should be the preferred method of estimation. Using these insights, a baseline model is 
constructed and laid out in equation (15).  
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 (15) 
 
The fixed effects transformation has been performed and time-specific dummies, represented 
by λt, has been included. These remove any effects that are specific for one individual year and 
makes the results more accurate. The marginal effect of corruption on growth in GDP per capita 
and TFP is then captured by γ. If corruption has a negative impact on growth, the 𝛾 coefficient 
should have a significant negative value.  
 
Equation (15) captures the overall effect of corruption for all the countries in the sample. 
Following DiRienzo and Das (2015) and Lee et al. (2020), one can argue that the effect of 
corruption might be different for different levels of economic wealth, as well as different levels 
of corruption. To test this, equation (15) is regressed three times, where the sample has been 
split into percentiles. One includes the 33% least corrupt countries, the second includes the 33% 
most corrupt countries and the last includes all the countries in between. The same exercise is 
done for the wealth level - here, the wealth ranking of countries is substituted for by the real 
GDP (per capita) ranking.  
 
Further, regressions on equation (15) are done for different continents and sub-continents to 
test for whether corruption affects different parts of the world differently. Dummy variables for 
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Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia are created. Doing this, the hypothesis that corruption 
might be beneficial in Southeast Asia and detrimental in Sub-Saharan Africa, could be tested. 
A dummy variable for Latin America is also included.  
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡





= 𝛾 + 𝛳 (17) 
 
Equation (16) is an extension of (15) where the dummy variables, Di, have been included. Di 
takes on the value 1 if the country is in the relevant group. The dummy variables are multiplied 
with the corruption variable, Cit, to form an interaction term. This allows the predicted effect of 
corruption to vary between the different levels of wealth. The marginal effect of corruption has 
therefore changed, which is shown in equation (17) as the partial derivative of y with respect to 
C. It consists of both the coefficients γ and ϴ. The net sum of these, determines the effect of 
corruption for rich, poor and middle-income countries respectively. If the value obtained in 
equation (17) differs between the groups, corruption can be thought to have different effects 
depending on the prevalent level of corruption or wealth.  
 
Further, as discussed in several of the earlier studies, institutions might have an influence on 
the effect of corruption on growth in both GDP per capita and TFP (Gradstein, 2004; Gründler 
& Potrafke, 2019; Lee et al., 2020; Singh, 2019). When governance is good, the effect of 
corruption should be mitigated. In order to investigate the relationship, the model must include 
some new terms, as shown in equation (28). 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡









Here, the new variable Iit is the governance indicators from the WGI dataset. This has some 
implication for the interpretation of the model. Firstly, the parameter ρ allows the level of y to 
vary with the quality of institutions. Secondly, the new interaction term gives a new 
interpretation of the effect of corruption. Equation (29), i.e., the partial derivative of y with 
respect to C, is the marginal effect of C on y. It now depends on the level of institutional quality, 
Iit. The effect of corruption is therefore dependent on how well a country’s institutions are 
performing. If institutions have a mitigating effect on corruption, 𝜙, should have a positive 
value.  
 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variables in the regression models creates some 
methodological issues. There is a simultaneity problem since the lagged variable appears on 
both sides of the equation. Fixed effects estimators could therefore become inconsistent if the 
time horizon is small, even if the idiosyncratic error term, 𝑖𝑡, is not serially correlated. In the 
literature, this problem is often dealt with by using the system GMM estimator, which uses 
lagged differences of the dependent variable as instrumental variables. By using system GMM, 
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity problems are addressed and the estimator becomes 
consistent and efficient. However, if GMM is to be considered an appropriate estimator, it needs 
to fulfill Hansen-tests for overidentifying instruments, F-tests for joint significance as well as 
two other tests that considers serial correlations in the error term. In this paper, the GMM 
estimator was evaluated. The results were mostly in line with the results from the fixed effects 
estimator, but with weaker significance levels and reduced absolute values for the coefficients. 
However, the four tests mentioned above were not jointly fulfilled. GMM estimation was 
therefore not pursued. Regardless, the GMM results were mostly in line with the fixed effects 
results. The models were also estimated without the lagged dependent variables. Except for 
some coefficient estimates having a weaker significance level and lower absolute values, the 
results were virtually unchanged. Islam and McGillivray (2020) estimated a similar model, with 
the lagged logarithm of GDP per capita on the right-hand side of the equation. They applied 
OLS/fixed effects and drew similar conclusions as the present study. Although the estimators 





5 Results and discussion 
This section will present the regression results of the different specifications of models, 
equation (15) to (19), with the associated discussion. Starting off, Table 3 shows the 
regression results for equation (15) where growth in real GDP per capita is the dependent 
variable. Cluster robust errors are reported in parenthesis, as the standard errors are thought to 
be dependent within countries.  
 
Table 3: Growth in real GDP per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GDPPC growth GDPPC growth GDPPC growth GDPPC growth 
cce 0.00331*** 0.00179 -0.0239*** -0.0241*** 
 (0.000872) (0.00131) (0.00738) (0.00754) 
     
Inflation  -0.0000891 -0.000521** -0.000497** 
  (0.000196) (0.000216) (0.000234) 
     
Trade  0.00846*** 0.0408*** 0.0362*** 
  (0.00219) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
     
FDI  -0.0116*** -0.00669 -0.00731* 
  (0.00358) (0.00409) (0.00370) 
     
Democracy  0.00916* 0.0195 0.0188 
  (0.00516) (0.0120) (0.0119) 
     
HC  0.00429 0.000542 -0.00788 
  (0.00397) (0.00971) (0.0134) 
     
K/L growth  0.484*** 0.559*** 0.612*** 
  (0.0419) (0.0510) (0.0469) 
     
Pop growth  -0.283** -0.123 -0.0192 
  (0.116) (0.292) (0.257) 
     
LnGDPPCt-1  -0.00799*** -0.0681*** -0.0684*** 
  (0.00196) (0.0114) (0.0133) 
     
_cons 0.00898*** 0.0668*** 0.714*** 0.739*** 
 (0.00236) (0.0188) (0.105) (0.136) 
N 2890 2166 2166 2166 
adj. R2 0.005 0.273 0.270 0.341 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS results are reported in column (3) and (4). Year 
fixed effects are included in column (4).  




Column (1) shows OLS estimates without the fixed effect transformation. Corruption, measured 
by cce, has a positive and significant coefficient. In relation to the discussion from section 2 
and 3, this result stands in opposition to what one would expect to find. However, the adjusted 
R-squared is small, at 0,005, indicating that the model does not explain the variation in growth 
very well. Given that this model has a number of omitted variables/controls, and that the 
possible presence of unobserved heterogeneity has not been controlled for, the positive 
coefficient for corruption is most likely picking up the effects of certain omitted variable(s). In 
column (2), the different control variables and lagged GDP per capita are added. The coefficient 
for cce is still positive, but smaller and it is no longer statistically significant. Trade, growth in 
capital and democracy are seen to have positive coefficients, while FDI, population growth and 
lagged real GDP per capita are all negative and significant at the 1% level. Adjusted R-squared 
has increased. In column (3), the fixed effect transformation has been performed. The 
coefficient for cce has now changed signs and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Year 
fixed effects are added in column (4), making the coefficient slightly larger and still strongly 
significant. The model predicts a 2,41 percent decrease in the real GDP per capita growth rate, 
if the corruption index increases by 1 point. This gives support for the hypothesis that corruption 
is detrimental to economic growth. Trade and growth in capital still have positive and 
significant coefficients, while inflation and FDI both have negative and significant coefficients. 
Growth in capital per capita have large and strongly significant coefficients. The lagged GDP 
per capita has a negative coefficient, significant at the 1% level. One must note that most of the 
variation in this variable is over countries, and not time. The result therefore gives support to 
the notion that countries with large initial GDP per capita (rich countries) have lower growth 
rates, thus giving support for the convergence hypothesis.  
 
Table 4 shows the same model, equation (15) with growth in TFP as the dependent variable and 
the associated control variables. In Table 4, the cce coefficient has a small but positive effect 
on TFP, significant at the 5% level. The adjusted R-squared is low, at 0,002. Adding the control 
variables in column (2), does not change the value, but it loses its statistical significance. FDI, 
trade and democracy are all significant, with trade having a positive value, and the other two 
having a negative one. Column (3) uses the fixed effects transformation and column (4) adds 
year fixed effects. The cce coefficient changes its sign and is significant at the 1% level. From 
the model, a one-point increase in the corruption index predicts a decrease in the growth rate in 
TFP by 2,21%. In light of the discussion in section 3.2.1, the results suggest that corruption, on 
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average, has a detrimental effect on the creation of technology. Trade has a positive effect on 
TFP growth. It is only significant at the 10% level, but it gives some support that more openness 
to trade seems to increase the growth rate in TFP. The lagged TFP variable is negative and 
significant, indicating that a larger stock of knowledge does not increase the growth rate. 
Table 4: Growth in TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth 
cce 0.00203** 0.00241* -0.0218*** -0.0221*** 
 (0.000817) (0.00140) (0.00738) (0.00732) 
     
FDI  -0.00926*** -0.00369 -0.00472 
  (0.00341) (0.00382) (0.00368) 
     
Trade  0.00634*** 0.0287** 0.0247* 
  (0.00214) (0.0126) (0.0127) 
     
HC  0.00646* -0.00154 -0.00276 
  (0.00340) (0.00854) (0.0130) 
     
Democracy  0.00958* 0.0196 0.0194 
  (0.00494) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
     
LnTFPt-1  -0.0117*** -0.0762*** -0.0723*** 
  (0.00306) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
     
_cons 0.00658*** 0.0570*** 0.543*** 0.521*** 
 (0.00221) (0.0202) (0.0826) (0.0909) 
N 2873 2269 2269 2269 
adj. R2 0.002 0.049 0.089 0.135 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS results are reported in column (3) and (4). Year 
fixed effects are included in column (4).  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
Again, a large source for technological progress for developing countries, could stem from trade 
and import of technology from developed countries. Rich countries, on the other hand, have to 
develop new technology through long and costly R&D efforts. They possibly already have 
possession of the latest and most advanced technologies, and when new technology is produced, 
the old technology is no longer as important. Poor countries with inferior technologies could 
then import the old technologies from rich countries, and subsequently experience a higher 




Next, the sample is split into three groups. These are 1) the 33% most corrupt countries, 2) the 
33% least corrupt countries and 3) the countries in the middle. Equation (15) is then run for 
both growth in real GDP per capita and TFP, for all three samples. The results are displayed in 
Table 5.  













 GDPPC growth GDPPC growth GDPPC growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth 
cce -0.0515*** -0.0193* -0.00594 -0.0424** -0.0149 -0.00856 
 (0.0154) (0.00975) (0.00807) (0.0182) (0.0101) (0.00725) 
       
Inflation -0.000481 -0.000134 -0.00133**    
 (0.000342) (0.000422) (0.000625)    
       
Trade 0.0400** 0.0325** 0.0228** 0.0229 0.0329** 0.0122 
 (0.0160) (0.0150) (0.00947) (0.0221) (0.0157) (0.0102) 
       
FDI -0.103 -0.115* -0.00507 -0.0373 -0.0821 -0.00208 
 (0.0662) (0.0642) (0.00495) (0.0745) (0.0523) (0.00466) 
       
Democracy 0.0226 -0.000694 0.000337 0.0263 -0.000610 0.00318 
 (0.0145) (0.00933) (0.0200) (0.0173) (0.00989) (0.0226) 
       
HC -0.0230 -0.00196 -0.0159 -0.00578 0.0000704 -0.0117 
 (0.0405) (0.0223) (0.0147) (0.0403) (0.0199) (0.0156) 
       
K/L growth 0.676*** 0.581*** 0.630***    
 (0.0735) (0.0710) (0.0926)    
       
Pop growth 1.241 -0.173 -0.0185    
 (0.982) (0.247) (0.352)    
       
LnGDPPCt-1 -0.128*** -0.0575*** -0.0708***    
 (0.0270) (0.0150) (0.0177)    
       
LnTFPt-1    -0.113*** -0.0727*** -0.0803*** 
    (0.0295) (0.0179) (0.0177) 
       
_cons 1.351*** 0.620*** 0.831*** 0.813*** 0.511*** 0.633*** 
 (0.270) (0.167) (0.196) (0.186) (0.134) (0.133) 
N 695 742 729 752 783 734 
adj. R2 0.353 0.402 0.468 0.104 0.225 0.291 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions apply fixed effects transformation and includes 
year fixed effects. Column (1) and (4) use the sample of the 33% most corrupt countries. Column (3) and (6) use 
the sample of the 33% least corrupt countries. Column (2) and (5) uses the sample of countries between the 33% 
and 66% percentiles.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
Column (1) to (3) display the regression results where growth in GDP per capita is the 
dependent variable. Growth in TFP is used as the dependent variable in column (4) to (6). For 
the most corrupt countries, in column (1), the results show a large significant negative effect of 
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corruption on growth in GDP per capita. A one-point increase in the corruption index is 
predicted by the model to reduce the growth rate in GDP per capita by 5,15%. In column (2), 
which uses the sample of countries ranging in the middle of the cce ranking, the cce coefficient 
is still significant, but with a lower absolute value. In column (3), the effect is no longer 
significant. The results suggest that the effect of corruption is higher for the most corrupt 
countries, and that this effect is reduced as the level of corruption in a country becomes smaller. 
Trade is seen to have a positive and significant coefficient for all three samples, while inflation 
only has a small, but negative effect for the least corrupt countries. For the model using growth 
in TFP as the dependent variable, the cce coefficient is large and significant for the most corrupt 
countries as well. The coefficient gets smaller in column (5) and is no longer significant. In 
column (6) it becomes even smaller and not significant. Corruption seems to have a larger effect 
on growth in TFP for the more corrupt countries. Trade has a positive coefficient in the sample 
containing the countries in the middle of the cce ranking. The estimate is significant at the 5% 
level. As for the lagged variables, all exhibit significant negative coefficients. Again, this gives 
support for the convergence hypothesis and not for the prediction of higher technological 
growth in richer countries from the Romer model.  
 
In Table 6 on the next page, the same exercise as in Table 5 is done, but this time the sample is 
separated by real capita GDP per capita ranks instead. For the regressions using growth in GDP 
per capita as the dependent variable, cce is seen to have a large negative coefficient for the low-
income countries, significant at the 1% level. In the middle-income countries, the coefficient is 
still negative and significant, but smaller. For the high-income countries, the effect is no longer 
significant. Inflation has negative and significant coefficients in column (2) and (3), while trade 
is seen to have positive and significant estimates for the low- and high-income countries. 
Interestingly, FDI has a negative coefficient for the low-income countries and a large positive 
one for the middle-income countries. Democracy has a positive coefficient for the low-income 
countries, albeit it is only significant at the 10% level. Growth in capital per capita has a 
significant positive coefficient for all. In the regressions using growth in TFP as the dependent 
variable, the cce estimate has a large negative coefficient for the low-income countries, 
significant at the 5% level. For the middle-income countries, the absolute value of the cce 
coefficient is reduced. The estimate is significant at the 1% level. For the high-income 
countries, the estimate is no longer significant. Trade is seen to have a positive coefficient for 
the high-income countries, significant at the 10% level. FDI has a large positive coefficient for 
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the middle-income countries. The lagged variables all have negative and significant 
coefficients, except for the coefficient in column (3). The results indicate that corruption has a 
larger effect on poor countries, and that it is reduced as the income level improves.  













 GDPPC growth GDPPC growth GDPPC growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth 
cce -0.0390*** -0.0249** -0.00902 -0.0326** -0.0252*** -0.00977 
 (0.0127) (0.00941) (0.0100) (0.0153) (0.00939) (0.00965) 
       
Inflation -0.0000237 -0.00139*** -0.00147**    
 (0.000238) (0.000288) (0.000728)    
       
Trade 0.0507*** 0.0145 0.0226** 0.0377 -0.000571 0.0185* 
 (0.0166) (0.0143) (0.00885) (0.0246) (0.0142) (0.0102) 
       
FDI -0.0899* 0.140** -0.00453 -0.0410 0.147** -0.00196 
 (0.0500) (0.0633) (0.00487) (0.0509) (0.0579) (0.00476) 
       
Democracy 0.0252* 0.00203 -0.0146 0.0303 -0.00269 -0.000237 
 (0.0138) (0.00528) (0.0141) (0.0189) (0.00728) (0.0136) 
       
HC -0.0117 -0.00210 -0.0149 0.00287 0.00663 -0.00789 
 (0.0410) (0.0194) (0.0130) (0.0406) (0.0193) (0.0132) 
       
K/L growth 0.616*** 0.695*** 0.509***    
 (0.0613) (0.0703) (0.104)    
       
Pop growth 1.865 0.153 -0.112    
 (1.715) (0.345) (0.357)    
       
LnGDPPCt-1 -0.0951*** -0.0913*** -0.0351    
 (0.0255) (0.0197) (0.0240)    
       
LnTFPt-1    -0.0757*** -0.147*** -0.0522** 
    (0.0242) (0.0246) (0.0198) 
       
_cons 0.896*** 1.017*** 0.459* 0.501*** 1.064*** 0.423** 
 (0.231) (0.216) (0.264) (0.140) (0.186) (0.161) 
N 736 667 763 789 691 789 
adj. R2 0.322 0.511 0.402 0.096 0.300 0.284 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions apply fixed effects transformation and includes 
year fixed effects. Column (1) and (4) use the sample of the 33% poorest countries. Column (3) and (6) use the 
sample of the 33% richest countries. Column (2) and (5) use the sample of countries between the 33% and 66% 
percentiles.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
In Table 7, the sample has separated again, this time by the different continents. Growth in real 
GDP per capita is the dependent variable. Oceania has not been included, due to an insufficient 
number of observations. Canada, Israel, Australia, New Zealand and the US have been included 
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in the sample of European countries, as they are perceived as more connected and similar to the 
European countries.  













 GDPPC growth GDPPC growth GDPPC growth GDPPC growth GDPPC growth GDPPC growth 
cce -0.0241*** -0.0268** -0.00598 0.00837 -0.0112 -0.0370** 
 (0.00754) (0.0111) (0.00663) (0.00977) (0.00790) (0.0159) 
       
Inflation -0.000497** -0.000115 -0.000785* -0.00125*** -0.00158*** -0.000230 
 (0.000234) (0.000459) (0.000395) (0.000193) (0.000371) (0.000212) 
       
Trade 0.0362*** 0.00891 0.00150 0.0122 0.0287** 0.0511*** 
 (0.0120) (0.00957) (0.0246) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0186) 
       
FDI -0.00731* 0.238*** 0.107** -0.0127 -0.00441 -0.126** 
 (0.00370) (0.0634) (0.0395) (0.0180) (0.00525) (0.0590) 
       
Democracy 0.0188 -0.00487 -0.0271 0.0276** 0.0537* 0.0235 
 (0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0229) (0.0100) (0.0315) (0.0184) 
       
HC -0.00788 -0.0234* -0.000956 0.0143 -0.0388* -0.0210 
 (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0447) (0.0272) (0.0214) (0.0429) 
       
K/L growth 0.612*** 0.697*** 0.963*** 0.773*** 0.488*** 0.660*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0847) (0.205) (0.0684) (0.107) (0.0689) 
       
Pop growth -0.0192 -0.173 1.417 -1.499 -0.516 2.323 
 (0.257) (0.255) (1.015) (1.478) (0.546) (1.930) 
       
LnGDPPCt-1 -0.0684*** -0.0167 -0.0884 -0.139*** -0.104*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0181) (0.0719) (0.0259) (0.0133) (0.0265) 
       
_cons 0.739*** 0.311 0.917 1.321*** 1.228*** 0.971*** 
 (0.136) (0.204) (0.824) (0.218) (0.154) (0.255) 
N 2166 514 142 187 692 615 
adj. R2 0.341 0.431 0.607 0.654 0.473 0.338 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions apply fixed effects transformation and includes 
year fixed effects. The columns are marked for which continent the sample contains.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
The cce coefficient for the Asian sample in column (2) is negative and somewhat larger in 
absolute value than the cce coefficient for the whole sample, and is significant at the 5% level. 
For Africa, in column (6), the cce coefficient is large and negative, and significant at the 5% 
level as well. For the other continents, the coefficient is not significant. Corruption therefore 
seems to have a greater impact in Asia and Africa. Also, for the other continents, inflation has 
a small, but significant negative coefficient. Further, trade is seen to have a significant positive 
effect in Africa, whilst FDI has a significant negative effect. FDI has positive coefficients in 
the South-American and Asian sample. Growth in capital per capita is positive and significant 
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for all. The lagged GDP per capita term is negative for all samples, but only significant for 
Latin America, Europe and Africa. 
 
Table 8: Grouped by continents (Growth in TFP) 
 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions apply fixed effects transformation and includes 
year fixed effects. The columns are marked for which continent the sample contains.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
Table 8 does the same exercise as in Table 7, but with growth in TFP as the dependent variable.  
Interestingly, the only significant coefficient for cce is in column (6), which contains the 
African sample. The results therefore suggest that corruption has a stronger effect on growth in 
TFP in this continent. FDI has large positive coefficients in column (2) and (3), significant at 
the 1% level, suggesting that FDI has a positive impact on TFP growth in Asia and South 
America. The lagged TFP variable has a negative coefficient for all samples. They are 
















 TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth 
cce -0.0221*** -0.0142 -0.0205 0.00572 -0.0107 -0.0435** 
 (0.00732) (0.0112) (0.0204) (0.00916) (0.00657) (0.0203) 
       
FDI -0.00472 0.251*** 0.160*** -0.0231 -0.00295 -0.0680 
 (0.00368) (0.0483) (0.0236) (0.0275) (0.00546) (0.0570) 
       
Trade 0.0247* 0.00817 0.0276 0.00833 0.0184 0.0443* 
 (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0382) (0.0166) (0.0129) (0.0246) 
       
HC -0.00276 -0.0152 -0.0279 0.00918 -0.0168 0.00752 
 (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0206) (0.0382) (0.0215) (0.0362) 
       
Democracy 0.0194 -0.00900 -0.128** 0.0349*** 0.0446 0.0346 
 (0.0129) (0.0142) (0.0496) (0.00736) (0.0272) (0.0227) 
       
LnTFPt-1 -0.0723*** -0.0350* -0.134 -0.0764* -0.135*** -0.0894*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0184) (0.0812) (0.0386) (0.0150) (0.0249) 
       
_cons 0.521*** 0.332** 1.102 0.426** 1.003*** 0.610*** 
 (0.0909) (0.150) (0.613) (0.190) (0.119) (0.174) 
N 2269 544 165 204 692 648 
adj. R2 0.135 0.140 0.314 0.264 0.438 0.112 
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Table 9: Sub-Saharan Africa versus Southeast Asia versus Latin America 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GDPPC growth GDPPC growth TFP growth TFP growth 
cce -0.0241*** -0.0224*** -0.0221*** -0.0206*** 
 (0.00754) (0.00848) (0.00732) (0.00769) 
     
Inflation -0.000497** -0.000506**   
 (0.000234) (0.000236)   
     
Trade 0.0362*** 0.0370*** 0.0247* 0.0264** 
 (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0130) 
     
FDI -0.00731* -0.00702* -0.00472 -0.00437 
 (0.00370) (0.00367) (0.00368) (0.00364) 
     
Democracy 0.0188 0.0200 0.0194 0.0215* 
 (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0129) (0.0123) 
     
HC -0.00788 -0.00942 -0.00276 -0.00564 
 (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0131) 
     
K/L growth 0.612*** 0.604***   
 (0.0469) (0.0478)   
     
Pop growth -0.0192 -0.0294   
 (0.257) (0.257)   
     
LnGDPPCt-1 -0.0684*** -0.0684***   
 (0.0133) (0.0132)   
     
DSEA*cce  0.0129  0.0334* 
  (0.0152)  (0.0189) 
     
DSSA*cce  -0.0133  -0.0212 
  (0.0193)  (0.0200) 
     
DLA*cce  0.0160  0.0190 
  (0.0135)  (0.0120) 
     
LnTFPt-1   -0.0723*** -0.0749*** 
   (0.0131) (0.0128) 
     
_cons 0.739*** 0.741*** 0.521*** 0.544*** 
 (0.136) (0.135) (0.0909) (0.0881) 
N 2166 2166 2269 2269 
adj. R2 0.341 0.342 0.135 0.140 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions apply fixed effects transformation and includes 
year fixed effects. Interaction terms with dummy variables are included. These are Southeast Asia (SEA), Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America (LA).  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
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In Table 9, equation (16) is estimated with dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast 
Asia and Latin America, in order to explore if the effect of corruption is different in these sub-
continents. The first two columns display the model for growth in GDP per capita and the two 
last columns display the model for growth in TFP. Column (1) and (3) show the regression 
without the dummy variables, for easier comparison. Most of the coefficients for the interaction 
terms are insignificant. In column (4), the interaction term for Southeast Asia, is both positive 
and significant at the 10% level, making the marginal effect of corruption positive. This gives 
some evidence for a “greasing the wheel” effect of corruption on growth in TFP. Evidence for 
“sanding the wheel” hypothesis in Sub-Saharan Africa is not found. Further, all the lagged 
variables have negative coefficients, significant at the 1% level.  
 
Next, Table 10 and 11 display the regressions results for equation (18), where the WGI 
indicators are included together with their interaction terms with the cce coefficient. Table 10 
shows the results for the growth in GDP per capita model, whilst Table 11 shows the results for 
the growth in TFP model.  
 
In Table 10, all the WGI and cce interaction terms are positive, indicating that higher level of 
institutional quality mitigates the effect of corruption on growth in GDP per capita. However, 
only some are statistically significant. These are voice and accountability (vae), government 
effectiveness (gee) and rule of law (rle). When these indicators are high, close to 5, the marginal 
effect of corruption, as defined in equation (19), is close to zero. However, at low levels, close 
to 0, the model predicts a substantially larger and negative effect of corruption on growth in 
GDP per capita. The lagged GDP per capita term is negative and significant at the 1% level in 











Table 10: WGI (Growth in real GDP per capita) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth 
cce -0.0241*** -0.0418*** -0.0332** -0.0464*** -0.0369** -0.0506*** 
 (0.00754) (0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.0157) (0.0171) 
       
Inflation -0.000497** -0.000465* -0.000413* -0.000436* -0.000405* -0.000463* 
 (0.000234) (0.000239) (0.000218) (0.000239) (0.000238) (0.000237) 
       
Trade 0.0362*** 0.0354*** 0.0384*** 0.0364*** 0.0363*** 0.0364*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0125) (0.0124) 
       
FDI -0.00731* -0.00650* -0.00665* -0.00618 -0.00654* -0.00515 
 (0.00370) (0.00371) (0.00367) (0.00374) (0.00369) (0.00368) 
       
Democracy 0.0188 0.0116 0.0157 0.0180 0.0170 0.0161 
 (0.0119) (0.00966) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0108) (0.0103) 
       
HC -0.00788 -0.00818 -0.00613 -0.00692 -0.00594 -0.00471 
 (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0137) 
       
K/L growth 0.612*** 0.617*** 0.610*** 0.613*** 0.614*** 0.614*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0470) (0.0466) (0.0465) (0.0471) (0.0465) 
       
Pop growth -0.0192 -0.00241 -0.0301 -0.0190 0.0156 -0.0189 
 (0.257) (0.249) (0.264) (0.264) (0.259) (0.265) 
       
LnGDPPCt-1 -0.0684*** -0.0712*** -0.0698*** -0.0721*** -0.0771*** -0.0710*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0135) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0148) 
       
vae  -0.0180     
  (0.0120)     
       
vae*cce  0.00832*     
  (0.00452)     
       
pve   -0.00517    
   (0.0105)    
       
pve*cce   0.00489    
   (0.00398)    
       
gee    -0.0195**   
    (0.00969)   
       
gee*cce    0.00943**   
    (0.00410)   
       
rqe     -0.00451  
     (0.0108)  
       
rqe*cce     0.00692  
     (0.00455)  
       
rle      -0.0295** 
      (0.0125) 
       
rle*cce      0.0100* 
      (0.00544) 
       
_cons 0.739*** 0.817*** 0.758*** 0.828*** 0.826*** 0.846*** 
 (0.136) (0.150) (0.145) (0.148) (0.160) (0.158) 
N 2166 2166 2166 2166 2166 2166 
adj. R2 0.341 0.344 0.348 0.345 0.346 0.345 
Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions apply fixed effect transformation and includes year fixed effects. Interaction 
terms with the WGI indicators are included.  





Table 11: WGI (Growth in TFP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth TFP growth 
cce -0.0221*** -0.0291 -0.0357** -0.0398** -0.0246 -0.0405** 
 (0.00732) (0.0185) (0.0145) (0.0179) (0.0199) (0.0204) 
       
FDI -0.00472 -0.00413 -0.00387 -0.00380 -0.00419 -0.00355 
 (0.00368) (0.00379) (0.00366) (0.00380) (0.00365) (0.00379) 
       
Trade 0.0247* 0.0247* 0.0270** 0.0249* 0.0248* 0.0252* 
 (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0130) 
       
HC -0.00276 -0.00261 -0.00124 -0.00174 -0.00125 -0.000574 
 (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0132) 
       
Democracy 0.0194 0.00944 0.0157 0.0186 0.0187 0.0165 
 (0.0129) (0.00961) (0.0113) (0.0127) (0.0120) (0.0113) 
       
LnTFPt-1 -0.0723*** -0.0756*** -0.0750*** -0.0754*** -0.0792*** -0.0763*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0144) 
       
vae  -0.00203     
  (0.0163)     
       
vae*cce  0.00457     
  (0.00602)     
       
pve   -0.0104    
   (0.0108)    
       
pve*cce   0.00686*    
   (0.00403)    
       
gee    -0.0169   
    (0.0120)   
       
gee*cce    0.00734   
    (0.00539)   
       
rqe     0.00565  
     (0.0145)  
       
rqe*cce     0.00343  
     (0.00616)  
       
rle      -0.0167 
      (0.0162) 
       
rle*cce      0.00846 
      (0.00646) 
       
_cons 0.521*** 0.547*** 0.559*** 0.587*** 0.535*** 0.587*** 
 (0.0909) (0.0993) (0.0943) (0.0935) (0.101) (0.100) 
N 2269 2269 2269 2269 2269 2269 
adj. R2 0.135 0.137 0.143 0.137 0.139 0.138 
Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions apply fixed effect transformation and includes year fixed effects. Interaction 
terms with the WGI indicators are included.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010 
 
 
In Table 11, all the interaction terms have positive coefficients. However, only political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism (pve) is statistically significant, at the 10% level. This 
suggests that more political stability positively influences the relationship between corruption 
and growth in TFP. The results do not seem to give much evidence for a mitigating effect of 
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institutional quality on the effect of corruption on TFP growth. In all the columns, lagged TFP 
has a significant negative coefficient. This further indicates that the hypothesis of faster 
technological growth in rich countries is not true.  
 
In general, the results show that corruption in general has a negative effect on both growth in 
real GDP per capita and growth in TFP. The effect seems to be larger for more corrupt countries, 
as well as low-income countries. For the least corrupt countries, as well as the high-income 
countries, the effect is not statistically significant. One must note that many of the same 
countries are present in both groups, i.e., some countries are both in the sample of the least 
corrupt countries and the sample of high-income countries. For the different regions of the 
world, the evidence suggests that the effect of corruption on growth in real GDP per capita and 
TFP is substantially larger in Africa. In the Southeast Asian countries, the results give support 
for a “greasing the wheel” effect of corruption on growth in TFP. Throughout the regressions, 
the lagged logarithm of real GDP per capita and the lagged logarithm of TFP, both exhibit 
significant negative coefficients. The results therefore give support to the convergence 
hypothesis. For Romer’s prediction of higher technological growth for rich countries with 
already high levels of TFP, this paper gives no evidence. In fact, the results point to the contrary, 
that lower levels of technology yield a higher growth rate in TFP. Again, this result can be 
attributed to the fact that poorer countries obtain much technology from trade, while rich 
countries have to develop new technology through the long process of research and 
development. For the WGI indicators, the results indicate that better governance and 
institutional quality reduces the effect of corruption on both growth in real GDP per capita and 
growth in TFP, although the evidence is not overwhelming. To test the robustness of the 
estimates for the main hypotheses, the regressions were run several times, where the different 
control variables were added/dropped. The corruption coefficient did not change much in this 








This paper has tried to explore the different causes as to why divergences in economic growth 
between countries occur. Several different theories have been developed in order to give an 
explanation. The Solow model explained growth through capital accumulation. Due to the 
diminishing marginal productivity of capital, poor countries should have higher growth than 
rich countries, thereby predicting a convergence in growth rates between rich and poor countries 
(Solow, 1956). The Romer model incorporated technological change into the model and 
hypothesized that growth in the long run would stem from the production of new technology. 
According to this model, rich countries would experience a higher growth in TFP. By 
employing a growth accounting exercise, a framework for empirical analysis was derived, 
expressed in equation (9). According to this formulation, economic growth could only originate 
from growth in the capital-output ratio, human capital or TFP.  
 
From the discussion in section 3, it emerged that institutions are thought to have an important 
function in economic development and growth. A lowering of corruption is thought to have an 
important role as it can affect the institutional quality within a country. The “greasing the 
wheel” hypothesis states that corruption has a positive effect on growth by speeding up 
troublesome bureaucratic processes. In opposition stands the “sanding the wheel” hypothesis 
which states that corruption makes the investment and innovation climate more uncertain, 
reducing economic growth.  
 
By using a cross-country panel dataset consisting of 170 countries over a time period of 17 
years, from 2002 to 2019, this paper has tried to explore what effect corruption and institutional 
quality have on economic growth. The paper has also tried to discover whether the effect differs 
between rich and poor countries, and if the “greasing the wheel” hypothesis is true for the 
Southeast Asian countries and “sanding the wheel” is true for the Sub-Saharan countries. 
Further, the convergence hypothesis from the Solow model and Romer’s prediction of faster 
technological growth for rich countries have been tested. To explore this, two estimation models 
were constructed, one for growth in real GDP per capita, based on equation (9), and one for 
growth in TFP. To control for unobserved heterogeneity, fixed effects estimation was applied. 
The control of corruption (cce) index from the WGI dataset was used as a proxy for corruption, 
in order to capture the effects of corruption on growth in real GDP per capita and growth in 
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TFP. To test the convergence hypothesis, the lagged logarithm of real GDP per capita was 
added in the model for growth in real GDP per capita. To capture the hypothesis of faster 
technological growth in rich countries, the lagged logarithm of TFP was added in the TFP 
growth model. The inclusion of lagged dependent variables could lead to the problem of 
inconsistent estimates when applying fixed effects estimation. However, the same regressions 
were also performed without the lagged dependent variables, and yielded virtually the same 
results. The inclusion of the lagged variables is therefore not perceived as a major issue.  
 
The results suggest that corruption has a negative/detrimental effect on growth in real GDP per 
capita and TFP in general. This effect is larger for low income and highly corrupt countries, 
according to the results in this study. The effect becomes smaller for middle income countries, 
as well as for countries with cce scores ranging in the middle of the cce ranking. For the high 
income and least corrupt countries, the results show that corruption does not have a significant 
impact. For the 15 richest and 15 least corrupt countries, the evidence even points towards a 
small positive effect of corruption on both growth in real GDP per capita and TFP. Continent-
wise, the effect of corruption seems to be larger in Africa than other continents. This is true for 
both growth in GDP per capita and growth in TFP. Further, the results give some support for a 
“greasing the wheel” effect in Southeast Asia for growth in TFP, albeit the estimate is only 
significant at the 10% level. The interaction terms with the WGI indicators also exhibits positive 
coefficients. This indicates that improved institutional quality mitigates the effect of corruption. 
As for the convergence hypothesis a la Solow and Romer’s prediction of higher technological 
growth for rich countries, the results, in line with the literature, lend support to the convergence 
hypothesis, but largely rejects the Romer prediction.  
 
To summarize, the results suggest that corruption in general has a detrimental effect on growth. 
This effect is seen to be larger for poor and corrupt countries. For the Southeast Asian countries, 
the evidence in this paper points towards a “greasing the wheel” effect for growth in TFP. The 
study gives support to the convergence hypothesis. It did not find evidence of the note that rich 
countries should experience higher growth in technology/TFP. In fact, evidence was found to 
the contrary. The results are robust as the coefficients retain their signs, albeit the absolute 
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